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Between Retrenchment and Recalibration:
The Impact of Austerity on the
Irish Social Protection System
Fiona Dukelow
Mairéad Considine
University College Cork, Ireland
This article analyzes the impact of austerity on the Irish social
protection system. The analysis is situated in Ireland’s wider financial and economic crisis and its status as an ‘early adopter’
of an austerity response which has continued under European
Union/International Monetary Fund intervention. We focus on
how the crisis instigated a political narrative about the cost and
design of the social protection system, leading to a programme of
retrenchment and reform which has blended a politics of blame
avoidance with credit claiming. Three core elements in this narrative—generosity, sustainability and suitability— are identified, and against this background, a pattern of multi-dimensional change in social protection across the life course dealing with
working age, pensions, and child income supports is analyzed.
Key words: Ireland, social protection policy, austerity, retrenchment, welfare

In the decade of unprecedented growth preceding Ireland’s
current crisis, debates about its economic and social policy
path were frequently framed in terms of ‘Boston versus Berlin.’
This dichotomy was articulated by a former prominent politician who proffered the view that “[w]e in Ireland have tended
to steer a course between the two but I think it is fair to say that
we have sailed closer to the American shore than the European
one” (Harney, 2000). Such ideas inevitably simplify complex
political and socio-economic realities, however the economic
policy trajectory closely followed the liberal market model, and
in the era of financialized capitalism Ireland became ‘a world
leader in the financialization of the economy’ (Ó Riain, 2012,
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2014, Volume XLI, Number 2
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p. 498). Yet in social policy terms, while typically linked with
the liberal welfare regime, the range of influences on Ireland’s
welfare development has meant that its position as a liberal
welfare state is open to some ambiguity. It has been observed
that it ‘defies classification’ and is better described as a ‘hybrid
regime,’ with links in particular to the welfare tradition of the
conservative/corporatist regime (Cousins, 1997; NESC, 2005).
Moreover, many (e.g., Daly & Yeates, 2003; Murphy, 2012)
noted that Irish social policy developments since the 1990s
steered a different path to those of the UK, the more prototypical liberal welfare regime in Europe.
Ireland’s economic crisis emerged as one of the most severe
cases following the global financial crisis and the subsequent
Eurozone crisis. It was primarily driven by an internally generated collapse of what Hay and Wincott (2012) term the "Anglo
liberal growth model" manifest in the bursting of its property
and credit bubbles, which had ruinous consequences for the
Irish financial system and which were ultimately absorbed by
the state. Ireland’s rapid turn to austerity, in which it was a
forerunner of a wider European turn to austerity, has leant it
exemplary status in debates about austerity versus stimulus.
On the Keynesian side, it confirms the ‘fantasy of austerity’ by
its continued poor economic performance (Krugman, 2012a,
2012b). For neoliberals, minor signs of economic improvement
are taken to indicate expansionary fiscal contraction, a theory
that suggests public spending cuts encourage private expenditure and capital investment (Adam Smith Institute, 2011).
Within the EU, the Irish case has been elevated as evidence
"that the programmes can work" (Barroso, cited in Mackintosh,
2013) and that EU/IMF loan conditions based on ‘fiscal consolidation’ have been the correct response to the Eurozone crisis.
In economic terms, Ireland’s crisis response marks the continued influence of its existing neoliberal paradigm (Allen, 2012;
Hay & Smith, 2013). In this regard, the Irish case tracks the ‘arc
of neoliberalism’ (Centeno & Cohen, 2012) that remains dominant, the European expression of which Fitoussi and Saraceno
(2012) identify as the ‘Berlin-Washington’ consensus. As such,
it appears the so-called ‘Boston versus Berlin’ dichotomy has
presently collapsed into no alternative but the former.
Our focus is to analyze what this ‘no alternative to austerity’ approach has meant for Irish social protection policy,
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identifying it as a key site of Ireland’s austerity politics. The
article, based on qualitative analysis of crisis-centered political debate and policy change, proceeds as follows. We set a
context by outlining the nature of political debate about the
crisis, attaching particular significance to how it implicated
the cost and design of social protection in both the causes of
and solutions to the crisis. We identify three core intertwined
elements in this narrative—the generosity, sustainability and
suitability of the social protection system. Against this backdrop, changes to social protection policy are analyzed across
three areas: working age, pensions and child income supports. Drawing on welfare retrenchment and welfare state
change literature and related distinctions between cost-cutting
and structural reform, we examine the types and degrees of
change being implemented, finding that the dominant pattern
of retrenchment is interacting with other crisis-led structural
changes, and the majority of the structural changes are leading
to further curtailment of the social protection system.

Austerity Politics and the Social Protection System
In contrast to early responses to the crisis inspired by
Keynesianism (Hemerijck, 2012; Pontusson & Raess, 2012) and
forms of fiscal stimulus in evidence across the Eurozone until
early 2010, Ireland’s austerity program was already well advanced. Any scope for maneuvering in Ireland was expended on its response to its banking crisis. In autumn 2008, the
government guaranteed almost all the liabilities of Ireland’s
domestic banks, exposing the state to private debts worth approximately 275% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This contrasted with more limited guarantees subsequently implemented elsewhere, and when combined with related bank rescue
measures, Ireland’s policy response ranked as "the costliest
banking crisis in advanced economies since at least the Great
Depression" (Laeven & Valencia, 2012, p. 20). Ireland’s economic contraction, which saw GDP decline by 12.4% between
2007 and 2010, together with its reaction to the banking crisis,
led to severe fiscal problems. The general government deficit
grew from a surplus of 0.1% of GDP in 2007 to 13.4% of GDP
in 2011, and general government gross debt rose from 25.1%
to 106.4% of GDP over the same period (Eurostat, 2013). A
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concern around the banking crisis was the speed and scale of
the turn to austerity. Between 2008 and 2010, fiscal adjustments
of almost 9% of GDP were implemented. By the time of the
loan agreement with the EU/IMF in late 2010, when Ireland’s
banking costs were overwhelming the state, the conditions attached represented a continuation of many steps already taken
with regard to fiscal policy and welfare retrenchment, and a
further adjustment of 9% of GDP was agreed upon for 20112013. Over both phases expenditure cuts have comprised approximately two thirds of the adjustments.
Whereas internationally the Irish case became something
of a brickbat in the debate between austerity and stimulus, nationally this debate was strongly one-sided. The main political
parties all accepted the need for austerity and the wider debt
and deficit parameters of the EU Stability and Growth Pact. In
making the case for investment and alternatives to austerity,
the weak power resources of actors on the left, a long standing
hallmark of Irish politics, meant it failed to make much impact
on the hegemony of ‘there is no alternative.’ Pierson’s (1994)
still influential theory of welfare retrenchment suggests that
it is an unpopular and risky move for governments to pursue
and that tactics of blame avoidance are typically utilized in
the process. However, our focus examines how welfare expenditure was framed in the crisis, not necessarily always in
an unequivocally blame-avoidant manner, but in ways which
blended with credit-claiming for being fiscally responsible. As
Bonoli (2012) notes, this is one of a limited number of ways in
which welfare retrenchment can become the object of a creditclaiming strategy. Ireland’s weak left, together with the populist tradition in Irish politics dominated by two main parties,
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael (both of which have operated under
opaque ideological divisions), may provide conditions compatible with a credit-claiming logic in conditions of crisis. In
particular, lack of robust ideological debate in political discourse affords latitude in the simultaneous adoption of ‘justification strategies’ (Green-Pedersen, 2002) that may seek to
avoid blame or claim credit, depending on the policy context.
While Ireland’s crisis has multiple dimensions, a core
element of political debate and interpretation has been framing
the crisis as a debt crisis. This had the effect of opening up government expenditure and the policy choices made prior to the
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crisis as objects of critique. In the words of former Taoiseach
(Head of Government) Brian Cowen:
As a society, we became over-optimistic about our
recent, seemingly spectacular, economic success, and
badly overshot the mark. People became impatient
with restraint. …The general attitude was that we could
afford to ramp up spending, while simultaneously
being a low tax country, as if there were few hard
choices to be made. (2010)
Strategies of welfare retrenchment became inextricably linked with prudent economic management, both by the
Fianna Fáil/Green Party government in power when the crisis
emerged, and by its replacement in 2011 by a Fine Gael/Labour
Party coalition.
In contrast with Pierson’s (2001) depiction of welfare states
entering an era of permanent austerity, the Irish welfare state
is often cast as a case of delayed development and appeared to
encounter a delayed golden age prior to the crisis. Economic
growth of the late 1990s and early 2000s provided unprecedented resources at governments’ disposal, thus enabling
increased welfare expenditure. At the same time, taxes and
social insurance contributions were reduced without fiscal repercussions. Social protection expenditure as a proportion of
GDP remained relatively stable (6.7% of GDP in 2001 and 7.7%
of GDP in 2007) and on the low side of European expenditure
patterns. Moreover, an analysis of social expenditure from 1981
to 2007 (McCashin, 2012) demonstrates how it was subject to
a range of trends. It was clearly expansionary in the case of
Child Benefits and retrenched in the case of Sickness Benefits,
while extension of coverage was the overriding driver of increased expenditure in other programs, such as pensions and
unemployment.
In keeping with the framing of the crisis as a crisis of public
expenditure, ‘generosity’ became a new term in the semantic
field of social protection. Political debate about the generosity
of the system emerged as a justification for its retrenchment,
especially in the early stages of the crisis. The idea was amplified with discussion of what became framed as the problem
of the generosity of social protection. Government references
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to generosity ranged between drawing attention to the generosity of the system as pre-emptive defense of critique against
cuts being implemented, to a ‘vice into virtue’ strategy (Levy,
1999) claiming that cuts would actually preserve the generosity of the system. In the latter case, rate cuts were justified as
preventive action against more catastrophic cuts if measures to
achieve fiscal stability were not undertaken. The first of two extensive cuts to payment rates were therefore claimed as action
to "safeguard the generous system we have" (Lenihan, 2009).
The issue of generosity was closely aligned to debates
about sustainability and the need to reach a sustainable
pattern of social expenditure. Sustainability encompassed the
broad fiscal policy landscape, which was deeply impacted by
a collapse in consumption/transaction dependent tax revenue
as the credit and housing bubbles burst. Consequently, tax
revenue fell by 33% between 2007 and 2010. Political debate
drew on a cluster of ideas associated with the notion of fiscal
responsibility and fiscal sustainability. Emphasis was placed
on adjusting expenditure to sustainable levels, which directly
implicated the social protection system, one of the largest areas
of current expenditure. Again, a blame avoidance strategy was
utilized, citing market pressure as a form of political cover
with respect to why cutting expenditure was the only credible option. The confluence of retrenchment with sustainability also became part of a credit-claiming strategy. This again
drew on the idea of retrenchment as necessary safeguarding
of the social protection system and the vulnerable. A similar
diagnosis of the unsustainability of social expenditure remains
central, with the current Minister for Public Expenditure and
Reform, Brendan Howlin (2012) asserting, for example, that
"our current levels of expenditure are no more sustainable than
the property bubble that once sustained them."
Concerns about the suitability of the focus and design of
the social protection system in the context of unemployment
(4.5% in 2007 to 14.8% by 2012) and the needs of the economy
came more to the fore as the crisis continued. However, associated debates about structural reform have not been altogether separate from the issue of generosity and cost containment. The relationship between social protection and the labor
market, and specifically activation policy, became the object of
greater scrutiny, because, as Fitzgerald (2012) puts it, "when

Austerity and the Irish Social Protection System

61

money was abundant, such structural change in programmes
was generally off the agenda" (p. 1372). The crisis, therefore,
stimulated a debate that potentially indicates a catch-up with
more substantive adaptation that has taken place elsewhere,
variously labeled as the emergence of the ‘new welfare state’
(Bonoli & Natali, 2012) and the ‘social investment welfare
state’ (Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012). The reform agenda of integrating the social protection system with labor market services was further driven by conditions imposed by the EU/
IMF. Initial debate revolved around the issue of disincentive
effects. This was articulated in ideas about the social protection system being "out of step with labor costs in the rest of
the economy" (Lenihan, 2009), and the need to keep the unemployed "as close to the labor market as possible" (Cowen,
2010). More explicit reference to re-orienting social protection
has occurred under the current government, which has tended
to use a ‘vice into virtue’ strategy of claiming to transform
the moribund legacy of a "passive welfare state to an active
welfare state" (Burton, 2012).
The remainder of the article looks at how these framing
ideas have influenced crisis-led change in social protection.
Although we have suggested that the Irish politics of austerity
has not solely been about blame avoidance, Pierson’s (2001)
conceptual distinction between cost-containment, re-commodification and recalibration is useful to deploy in looking at
how ideas about generosity, sustainability and suitability have
translated into policy change. Changes have therefore spanned
from high visibility cost cutting to re-structuring, though the
latter can be difficult to disentangle from the former. As an addendum to this, and to the concept of recalibration in particular, debates about the new welfare state and ‘new social policies’ have drawn attention to how retrenchment-led change is
not only about cutting back existing social protection, but also
about introducing new forms of provision and intervention.
In this sense, an era of austerity can have multi-dimensional
effects; Häusermann (2012) observes that change can simultaneously involve expansion of activation (flexicurity), re-allocation of spending from more generous to means-tested provision (welfare re-adjustment), and in some cases, preservation
of existing provision (welfare protectionism).
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Irish Social Protection
The Irish social protection system has traditionally been
primarily oriented towards the goal of poverty alleviation as
opposed to income replacement. It comprises social insurance
payments and a corresponding set of social assistance payments covering various contingencies such as unemployment,
illness and disability, caring, one-parent families, and pensions.
Social insurance is based on pay-related contributions and flat
rate payments, and for most working age payments, there is no
differential between the value of a social insurance payment
and its corresponding social assistance payment, whereas
for pensions the differential is 10%. The state (contributory)
pension payment is approximately 34% of average earnings
which is a comparatively low replacement rate (Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2011).
Replacement rates for unemployment payments also tend to
fall below the OECD average (NERI, 2012). Family and childrelated income supports comprise a universal Child Benefit
(CB) payment with additional means-tested payments targeted at low income families.
The Irish social protection system stands out for having
a significant proportion of means-tested payments, typically ranking highest on this indicator in the EU. In 2008 for
example, 25.2% of all payments were means-tested compared
to 11.1% for EU27 (Eurostat, 2012). Overall, therefore, the
Irish social protection system tends to "modify tendencies to
extreme inequalities rather than attempting substantial redistribution or universal social provision" (McCashin & O’Shea,
2007, p. 274). In the period prior to the crisis, this orientation
was manifest in poverty rates which remained above the EU
average, reflecting the fact that while payment rates grew,
they remained low relative to average incomes. The poverty
reduction effects of welfare payments did improve by the mid2000s when social protection rates were raised ahead of wage
growth rates, and the risk of poverty rate converged with the
EU average. However, the impact of subsequent recession and
welfare retrenchment is evidenced in increases in at-risk-ofpoverty rates (16% in 2011) and a sharp rise in the deprivation
rate, which has more than doubled since 2007 (24.5% in 2011).
Children remain the age cohort at highest risk of both poverty
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(18.8%) and deprivation (32.1%), and the at-risk-of-poverty
rate for unemployed people (30.6%) is also particularly high
(CSO, 2013). Against this backdrop, the role and impact of the
social protection system and its reform remains central.

Working Age Social Protection
Under the justificatory strategy of a generous system, outright cost cutting has formed a large part of the retrenchment
measures implemented. Rate cuts were applied to all working
age payments in Budgets 2010 and 2011. These cuts, together
with the abolition of an extra payment at Christmas, represent
a cumulative reduction of 10%. Despite comprehensive rate
cuts being a highly visible form of cost containment, relatively
little mobilization against them and against austerity more
broadly, took place. Pierson’s (2001) observation about the
institutional design of liberal welfare systems may be applicable, in that systems which have a high means-tested component militate against strong popular support for welfare. More
severe rate cuts have been applied to certain social assistance
payments. A 51% reduction to Jobseeker’s Allowance (JA) for
claimants aged 18 and 19 in 2009 was extended to claimants
aged 18-21 in 2010, with a 30% cut applied to those aged 22-24.
In addition, a 30% rate reduction sanction was introduced
where claimants refuse activation. Such change points to the
cross-cutting agendas of activation and cost-containment, as
well as the ambiguity of activation and ideas such as ‘making
work pay,’ which can emphasize ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ (Kuhner,
2012).
Substantial re-commodification, a relatively more obfuscating strategy than rate cuts, is also being undertaken. This
is particularly evident in the case of Jobseekers Benefit (JB), as
qualifying conditions for social insurance payments were tightened and the duration of entitlement substantially reduced.
The number of contributions required to qualify doubled, and
the duration of entitlement has been significantly curtailed.
Other forms of re-commodification concern the complex rules
of entitlement and qualifying conditions which vary across
the contingency-based system. They include restrictions to
entitlements to concurrent payments; changes to income disregards where claimants may work but continue to qualify
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for a payment; stricter means-testing; expanding taxable
payments; reductions to qualifying adult payments, rent supplement and other additional allowances. The One Parent
Family Payment has undergone the most significant change in
this regard, stemming from reform ideas first broached in 2006
but substantially stalled until the crisis occurred. Eligibility is
now also being based on the age of the parent's youngest child,
which is being reduced on a phased basis (from 18 years in
2011 to 7 years for all claimants by 2015).
Although Irish activation expenditure has been highlighted as being relatively high in comparative terms, the crisis
has brought the system into sharper focus and opened up
the possibility of substantial recalibration. Activation policy
has been criticized for being "fragmented and lacking ambition," having a "passive and low-intensity" approach, and
lagging behind developments elsewhere (NESC, 2011, p. xv).
Given Ireland’s conservative and incremental culture of policy
making (Kirby & Murphy, 2011), the crisis and the influence of
transnational policy actors has stimulated significant institutional reform. Responsibility for activation services has moved
to the Department of Social Protection, and a new agency, the
National Employment and Entitlements Service, is being established. At the local level, the integration of social protection and activation services is being introduced under a single
new service, Intreo. Modeled on the UK system, the changes
entail a more individualized case management approach than
heretofore, including profiling techniques to tailor interventions based on claimant’s employability and risk of long-term
unemployment. Active labor market programs are also being
reformed, to include greater flexibility of qualifying conditions
to some, the introduction of some new schemes and the retrenchment of more ‘passive’ programs. In all, however, the
scale of provision falls far short of the scale of the unemployment crisis.
More far-reaching recalibration was signaled by a report
which examined the feasibility of introducing a single social
assistance payment for people of working age (Department of
Social Protection, 2010). It proposed a single payment with different levels of conditionality and support, depending on the
distance of the claimant from the labor market. Payment levels,
modeled on JA rates and rules, would represent a rate cut for
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claimants of other schemes, though it is not clear at present
whether such radical reform will progress.

Pension System Reform
Pension system reform has been on the policy agenda for
the last two decades, and has been marked by a series of incremental but limited reforms to incentivize supplementary
pension arrangements, whilst simultaneously attempting
cost containment and addressing inadequacies in state provision. The most recent policy statement, the National Pensions
Framework (NPF) (Government of Ireland, 2010a), places
particular emphasis on affordability and long-term system
sustainability. The core policy principles applied to first-tier
pensions appear largely unchanged, as "the State Pension will
continue to be the fundamental basis for the pension system"
(Government of Ireland, 2010a, p. 14). In fact, the stated 35%
replacement target rate represents an improvement on previous policy ambition. Payment rates increased during the precrisis period, before being frozen in 2009 when state pensions
were the only payments not to be cut in the retrenchment that
followed. This treatment could be read as welfare protectionism, in which privileges of existing beneficiaries have been
shielded against demands associated with newer/other risk
groups. However, it needs to be considered in conjunction
with simultaneous welfare re-adjustment measures introduced
with respect to social insurance eligibility requirements. The
proposal to move to a total contributions approach by 2020,
and the increase in the state pension qualification age from age
65 to 66 in 2014, to 67 in 2021 and to 68 in 2028, a comparatively
shorter timeframe than in most other European welfare states,
indicates the scale of the change (Considine, 2012).
In terms of second-tier pensions, the introduction of personal retirement savings accounts (PRSAs) in the early 2000s
marked an effort at re-commodification which sought to make
private pension arrangements more accessible. However,
PRSAs did not have a significant impact and the NPF proposes that a system of auto-enrolment be introduced to increase
supplementary coverage. This measure is proposed for 2014,
although its introduction remains contingent on a general
improvement in macro-economic conditions. This potential
change could be interpreted as path departure in terms of
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obligation to contribute to a second-tier pension, although
given the longstanding policy to incentivize individual/occupational provision through pension tax benefits; it is simultaneously a policy instrument which gives preference to a significant pre-existing element of provision, with enforcement to
broaden coverage. It may therefore be considered a structural
change that is potentially significant in terms of the role and
reach of quasi-mandatory second-tier provision. However,
the existing duality in the system, where half of the workforce already broadly conforms to this policy objective, and
the limited reform of core tax benefit arrangements, points to a
limited redirection of pension policy preferences to date. High
income earners remain much more likely to have supplementary pensions, make higher contributions and benefit from tax
relief, while lower earners are less likely to benefit from this
tax expenditure at all. Pension tax benefits were set to be substantially overhauled and made more equitable (Government
of Ireland, 2010a, 2010b). Measures introduced over recent
Finance Acts limit generous tax benefits to the highest income
earners, although the mainframe of the tax benefit structure
(delivered at standard and marginal rates of tax) remain unchanged. Budget 2013 maintains the status quo in this regard,
with focus centered on limiting tax relief to pensions that
accrue an income of over €60,000 per annum.
Finally, the Irish variant of the multi-pillar system, and in
particular the reliance on the market for the provision of adequate retirement income replacement and the risks to which
they are exposed, has been brought into sharper focus by the financial crisis, as Irish pension losses were second only to those
of the U.S. in 2008 (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 2011). Approximately 70% of defined benefit
schemes in Ireland are in actuarial deficit (Pensions Board,
2012), contribution levels to many private pensions are widely
regarded as insufficient, and there is a lack of transparency/
clarity around charges applied and the impact of pension fund
losses more generally (Stewart, 2011). It is against this wider
backdrop that current Irish pension system reform needs to
be examined; existing patterns of dualization may be altered,
but the direction that will take depends on which elements
of the reform agenda are prioritized and the manner of their
implementation.
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Child Income Supports
Child Income Supports (CIS) evolved in an ad hoc and fragmented way over an extended period; these were designed to
meet a range of policy objectives, from alleviating poverty to a
state recognition of the costs associated with raising children.
The system comprises a mix of targeted and universal provisions, which underwent significant expansion in 2006 with the
introduction of an Early Childcare Supplement (ECS), paid in
respect of all children age 0-6 years to offset childcare costs.
This payment represented a typically liberal cash-based response to the cost of childcare issue. However, the ECS was one
of the first welfare payments to be abolished as retrenchment
took effect. It was replaced in 2010 with the Early Childhood
Care and Education (ECCE) scheme, an illustration of welfare
recalibration with an unprecedentedly rapid shift from cash
assistance to universal social service delivery. Whatever the
shortcomings of the ECCE scheme, its introduction at a time
of austerity represents a noteworthy policy departure that
engaged simultaneously in rationalizing and updating to accommodate wider policy goals in relation to the care and education of young children.
There has been considerable retrenchment of other elements of CIS since 2008. CB was noted for its cost containment
potential and was cut in successive budgets. Eligibility criteria
were also restricted, with payments no longer made in respect
of 18-year-olds still in education. CB rates have been cut by
almost 22% for the first two children, with higher reductions in
respect to subsequent children. Some compensatory measures
were instituted initially through Qualified Child Increases
and Family Income Supplement to protect low income families, although such measures were not applied in more recent
Budgets, and some other targeted payments were also reduced.
Pointing to the rapid increases in the cost of CB, which
saw the payment rate treble between 2000 and 2007, the need
for a more efficient and targeted approach is regularly espoused. Broadly speaking, this efficiency/equity argument
divides between preferences to tax CB and/or the removal
of its universal basis in favor of targeted means-tested
provision. A report on child and family income support
(Advisory Group on Tax and Social Welfare, 2012) advocates
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the retention of a reduced universal payment and proposes a
two-tier CIS payment comprising CB and an automatic supplementary payment (to replace the existing ones) in respect
of children whose parents are in receipt of a social assistance
payment. Other parents (including those in receipt of social
insurance payments) would be subject to application and
income-test for the supplementary element of this income
support, with a greater degree of means-testing one inevitable
outcome of this reform.
No government decision has been made at the time of
writing in respect to these CIS proposals, but the discussion
points to a shift away from the old ‘logics of welfare reform’
(Häusermann, 2012) with a particular focus on welfare re-adjustment. Significant retrenchment of universal child income
payments has been coupled with greater attention to the new
logic of social investment and needs-based child income supports. Wider social service supports in relation to children and
families matter to how this may develop, and consideration of
the social investment approach is a relatively new departure
in terms of the Irish welfare state. In this context, the relatively
swift introduction of the ECCE scheme, even at the height of
the economic crisis, may point to some shift in policy thinking that has social investment leanings. How far this extends,
however, is a far more open question, as the retrenchment
imposed through a series of rate cuts and changes to eligibility rules has simultaneously negatively affected the incomes of
many families with children.

Conclusion
In this article we have examined how the politics of austerity in the Irish case have been framed by a number of salient
ideas, in ways which blend blame avoidance with credit claiming in how changes to the social protection system have been
approached. We have located Ireland's policy choices within
the wider contradictory neoliberal response to the economic
crisis, from which the ‘no alternative to austerity,’ which simultaneously requires substantial state support of financial systems, has emanated. Turning to examine the impact
of austerity on the social protection system, and drawing on
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Pierson’s concepts of cost-containment, re-commodification
and recalibration, it is clear that all three types of change are
occurring. Substantial cost-containment and re-commodification across programs for working age adults have blurred
the already weak boundary between the benefits attached to
social insurance and social assistance payments, while in the
case of child income supports, universal payments are being
retrenched in favor of targeted forms of support. These trends
appear to accentuate the liberal characteristics of the social
protection system.
The crisis has also stimulated stronger recalibration, manifest in new types of services and program design for working
age adults and children. These are indicative of an effort to
re-orient the norms upon which the social protection system
has been built, from alleviating poverty by compensating for
unemployment and other ‘old’ social risks, to supporting and
incentivizing employment. In the crisis context, however, such
recalibration has been subordinated to and limited by the goal
of cost-containment, with the effect that rate cuts and sanctions
have constituted a significant element of the emerging activation approach. It remains to be seen how individualized case
management will evolve in this environment.
The crisis added urgency to a long-standing reform agenda
concerning pension sustainability and equity, yet wide ranging
tax benefit reform proposed has been only partially implemented, appearing to preserve existing inequities in the system.
While the absence of rate cuts to state pensions demonstrates
that welfare protectionism can occur even in severe crises, substantial re-commodification is in prospect for future claimants.
Altogether, these changes are producing a complex, uneven
picture of the impact of austerity on the Irish social protection system, the effects of which are still unfolding. However,
the current reform agenda displays less system hybridity than
heretofore, with Irish social protection moving towards more
archetypal liberal welfare principles and patterns in the ways
it is both being retrenched and recalibrated.
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